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Abstract
Password based authentication shows its vulnerability against inversion attack model in which adversary obtains plaintext password
from its corresponding hashed value. To cope up with such attack, honeyword based authentication technique is introduced. In
this technique, along with the original password of user, some dummy passwords or honeywords are also stored. Although this
technique is good enough to address the aforementioned security breach, but use of additional storage to store the honeywords is
still an overhead associated with such approach. In this paper, we have proposed few directions to minimize the storage cost of
some of the existing honeyword generation approaches. We have even found that in some cases no additional storage overhead is
required. A comparative analysis at the end also shows that the proposed techniques are able to raise some of the security features
compared to existing honeyword generation approaches.
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1. Introduction
There are mainly four factors related to user authentication: authentication by something user knows (e.g., pass-
word), authentication by something user has (e.g., physical token), authentication by something the user is (e.g.,
biometric authentication) and authentication by someone user knows1. Among these four factors of authentication
techniques, password based authentication is widely accepted for its simple login functionality and ease of memora-
bility. Because of its popularity, password based authentication schemes have also been explored using diﬀerent attack
models2 3 4. Inversion attack is one such lately developed attack model5 on password based authentication technique
which opens up a new security breach for those systems which are protected by password.
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1.1. Inversion attack
System generally stores usernames and passwords in password ﬁle (FP). Though usernames are stored in the plain
text, passwords are maintained in hash format. If FP is compromised, an adversary readily gets the data stored in FP.
Retrieving user’s password from the hashed value is the main objective of inversion attack model. Earlier adversary
performed brute force search to obtain the user’s password from the corresponding hashed password. In 20086, Jhon
the Ripper developed a technique based on password reuseability policy of users on the dictionary words which helped
to reduce the brute force search complexity with high percentages. In 2009, Weir et al. 7 proposed an algorithm based
on probabilistic context free grammar to further improve the inversion rate from 28% to 129%. Recently in 2014, Ma
et al. showed that by using hidden markov chain model, system can invert the hashes with higher success rates5. Thus,
by performing inversion attack, adversary may obtain user password (p) from corresponding hashed value (H(p)).
There are some signiﬁcant evidences of inversion attack on some reputed web based organizations. Report reveals
that adversaries have successfully inverted many passwords of some giant web based service provider like Yahoo,
LinkedIn, RockYou and others8. In recent past, 50 million passwords of Evernote have been successfully inverted
under the same attack scenario9. Thus, there is a strong urgency of developing a security model which robustly
handles this attack.
1.2. Honeyword based authentication technique: a security measure against inversion attack
In honeyword based authentication technique, against each username, system maintains k-1 (k > 2) dummy pass-
words (also known as honeywords) along with original user password. Index position (ci where 1 ≤ ci ≤ k) of original
password is stored in a diﬀerent server, known as honeyChecker and is denoted here as HC. From the adversary
perspective, after compromising the FP, she gets confused among k passwords. If adversary picks a honeyword then
directed index value to HC doesn’t get matched with the original password index, stored in HC and thus, breach is
detected. Therefore, honeyword based authentication technique lures the adversary with a probability value of k−1k .
Though honeyword based authentication technique gives tremendous support to get rid oﬀ the inversion attack
but there exists a inherit drawback of all honeyword based approaches proposed so far. Using a standard hashing
algorithm (e.g. SHA−1) system generates h bytes long hashed string. Thus, honeyword based approaches incur an
additional storage overhead of (k-1) × h bytes per account, which is a serious concern10, 11.
1.3. Motivations and Contributions
Reducing the storage overhead of some newly proposed honeyword generation methods (which overcome the
limitations of previously proposed schemes) is our primary motivation behind this work. Along with reducing storage
overhead we have also tried to improve the security standard without degrading the usability standard of the existing
techniques. Mainly driven by these factors we have made following contributions in this paper.
• Contribution 1: We have considered four existing honeyword generation techniques − (a) Modiﬁed-tail (b)
Caps-key (c) Close-number-formation and (d) Pre-processing to minimize their storage overhead.
• Contribution 2: The security standard of those schemes are also been improved during the course of optimizing
the storage cost.
2. Security, Usability and Storage Standards of Honeyword Based Schemes
To begin with, we ﬁrst discuss the security standard of honeyword based authentication techniques and followed
by this we introduce the usability standard and storage overhead of honeyword based approaches. Security, storage
and usability standards are collectively referred as SSU standards or, SSU parameters in the subsequent sections.
2.1. Security Standards
The security standard of any honeyword based approach can be measured with respect to three parameters (a) DoS
resiliency (b) Multiple System Vulnerability (MSV) and (c) Flatness. These parameters are elaborated next.
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(a) DoS resiliency: Knowing the original password of a user if adversary can guess any honeyword, maintained for
that user acount, then adversary may intentionally submit the honeyword to raise an alarm by the HC. In this scenario,
system assumes that FP has been compromised when it is actually not. This phenomenon is known as DoS attack.
Chaﬃng-by-tweaking10 methods are identiﬁed as weak DoS resilient schemes where the generated honeywords some-
times are easily guessable by the adversary. On the other hand modeling-syntax-approach12 provides strong security
against such attack.
(b) Multiple System Vulnerability For a given password, a honeyword generation algorithm creates diﬀerent list
of honeywords at each run. Thus, using same honeyword generation algorithm, two diﬀerent systems produce diﬀerent
lists of honeywords for the same user password. If adversary becomes able to compromise both these FPs then by
performing intersection operation between those two lists of passwords, the intruder gets the original password of the
user. This is known as multiple system vulnerability of honeyword generation approaches. Most of the honeyword
based algorithms provide weak security against MSV. However, take-a-tail10, paired-distance-protocol13 are two
exceptions in this context.
(c) Flatness: Flatness property of a honeyword based approach ensures that all the sweetwords (honeywords along
with user’s original password) stored against a username should be equally probable from the adversary perspective
while selecting the original user’s password (or, sugarword). In other words, using a perfectly ﬂat honeyword gener-
ation approach, adversary has no advantages in terms of identifying the original user’s password. A good honeyword
generation approach requires to be perfectly ﬂat (e.g., take-a-tail) to lure the attackers among k possible sweetwords.
2.2. Usability Standards
The usability standard of a honeyword generation approach is determined through three parameters namely − (a)
System interference (b) Stress on memorability and (c) Typo safety.
(a) System interference A honeyword generation approach is said to have system interference if it forces users to
remember some extra information during login along with username and password. Take-a-tail10 approach interferes
in password choice of users whereas modeling-syntax-approach12 has no system interference.
(b) Stress on memorability: Stress on memorability is directly related to system interference parameter. Remem-
bering additional information imposes extra load on human mind. Depending on how much extra information is to be
remembered by user, this feature can be classiﬁed into two categories (i) High stress on memorability: where (e.g.
take-a-tail) user remembers n system generated information as a part of his login credential for n diﬀerent web ac-
counts. (ii) Low stress on memorability: where (e.g. caps-key) user may remember no/single extra information of his
own choice to login into n diﬀerent accounts. A good honeyword system always imposes low stress on memorability
to maintain a high usability standard.
(c) Typo safety: A highly typo safe honeyword system ensures that typing mistakes of user, during the course of
entering password, hit a honeyword with negligible probability. This is a very important criterion from the usability
perspective as a less typo safe method can lead to a false detection and block the user account due to typing mistake
of a genuine user. Chaﬃng-by-tweaking methods are less typo safe whereas modeling-syntax-approach sets high typo
safety.
2.3. Storage Cost
The passwords are stored in the system database after converting into an equivalent hashed form. If the hashed
strings is considered as h bytes long, then to store single password information h bytes memory space will be required.
On the other hand as honeyword based authentication technique stores k sweetwords to lure the attackers thus, the
required storage cost becomes k × h bytes. In10 authors argued that suitable value of k should be 20 to maintain a
moderate detection rate. Using a standard hashing algorithm like SHA−256 the values of h becomes 32 bytes. So
honeyword based authentication technique incurs an additional storage overhead of (k-1) × h or, 19 × 32 = 608 bytes.
This can be identiﬁed as one of the signiﬁcant drawbacks of honeyword or decoy password generation protocols10 11.
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3. Review of Some Recently Proposed Approaches
As discussed earlier, while selecting few honeyword generation approaches under consideration, we focus on
recently proposed approaches in14, as those overcome most of the limitations of previously proposed approaches in
this domain. Under the scope of this section we give brief overviews on proposed methods in14.
3.1. Modiﬁed−tail
In this approach user selects extra information (tail) of length  from a set (S) of characters as a part of his login
credential. The set of characters are chosen in such a manner so that they avoid few obvious patterns (e.g. sequential
key stroke) in the keyboard. In Fig. 1, we show a probable list of elements that can be chosen to form the set S as
shown in14.
Fig. 1. Elements @ | and ? are selected as members of S
The honeywords are generated from the diﬀerent combinations of elements from S, having length |S |, appended to
the user password. For example, if user selects his password as alex and selects tail as ?@ then the list of sweetwords
for the set S are presented below −
alex?|@ alex?@| alex@?| alex@|? alex|?@ alex|@?
One interesting characteristic of modiﬁed-tail is that from a set of |S | characters, user has to choose |S |-1 characters
as tail. While verifying the password, system appends the remaining character to the tail to construct the complete
password. Thus, if user enters alex?@, where ?@ is the selected tail by user, then system appends the remaining
character ‘|’ from S to the entered string and treats alex?@| as user’s submitted password.
Reviewing the SSU parameter of modiﬁed-tail: As modiﬁed−tail demands an extra information to be remem-
bered by the user of his own choice thus, stress on memorability using this approach is on lower side with having
system interference. The method is also typo safe as selected characters to build the set S are far apart from each other
on a standard keyboard (as shown in Fig. 1). This method maintains high security standard for MSV and Flatness
parameters. Modiﬁed−tail is a weak DoS resilient scheme thus, light security policy against DoS may be adopted.
This method requires k × h bytes of storage cost to setup the inversion attack detection architecture.
3.2. Caps-key
Using caps-key based honeyword generation approach, user selects m alphabets in capital from his password con-
taining n (where n > m) alphabets. From the chosen password of user, system generates the honeywords after taking
diﬀerent combinations of m alphabets in capital. Thus, number of possible sweetwords by using this approach be-
comes
(
n
m
)
. Among the possible options of sweetwords, system chooses k sweetwords according to its requirement.
For example, for the password as AnImal − where user chooses m = 2 letters in capital, there are
(
6
2
)
− 1 = 14 possible
ways for generating the honeywords. Now for k = 6, system may generate following list of sweetwords −
AniMal aNImal AnImal animAL AnimaL animal
Reviewing the SSU parameter of caps-key : Using this approach, as user requires to remember some extra
information (in terms of capital letters in password) of his own choice to cope up with the honeyword based scheme
thus, the method imposes low stress on memorability with some system interference. The method is also less typo
safe as it might be case that users typing mixed case passwords will slow down to press the caps lock or shift key
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or it might be that they will type at the same speed and suﬀer from a sticky shift or too soon/late presses that will
increase their typo rate. From the security perspective this method generates absolute ﬂat honeywords. The security
parameters related to this approach have also been re-analysed here.
In14, authors shows that for a ﬁxed value of m, security against MSV depends on n. As n increases, for ﬁxed value
of both m and k, security against MSV decreases. In14 authors also mentioned the following relation between DoS
and MSV parameters −
Pr(DoS) ∝ 1
Pr(MSV)
(1)
Thus, with the increasing value of n, security against DoS goes high using this method. Storage cost for maintaining
sweetwords using this approach can be evaluated as same as modiﬁed-tail approach.
3.3. Close-number-formation
Using close-number-formation honeyword based algorithm, system generates decoy passwords that are much
closed to the number, used in the original password. For example, if original password chosen by user contains
1992 (e.g. alex1992) then formed sweetwords for k = 6 may be as follows −
alex1994 alex1996 alex1999 alex1992 alex1990 alex1989
For generating close numbers, system maintains two sets as num = {1, 2, 3} and sig = {+,−}. After retrieving the
digit (dp), used in the user password, system generates the digit (dh) used in ﬁrst honeyword, by tweaking dp using
following equation.
dh = dp e(sig) e(num) (2)
Here e(sig) and e(num) denote an element from the set sig and num, respectively. For generating subsequent
honeywords, system randomly selects a digit from the generated sweetwords. After selecting the digit, system tweaks
that digit with the help of e(sig) and e(num).
Reviewing SSU parameter of CNF: This method doesn’t inﬂuence the password choice of user and hence system
interference and stress on memorability using this method become insigniﬁcant. This method is not much typo safe
as generated honeywords contain closer numbers with respect to the number used in actual password of the user.
Mounting DoS attack becomes easy in CNF as the generated honeywords are predictable by the adversary. Achieving
high security standard in terms of addressing MSV and ﬂatness criteria can be identiﬁed as major strengths of CNF.
Like modiﬁed-tail and caps-key, the required storage cost is same as k × h bytes using CNF method.
3.4. Preprocessing technique
In14, authors show that there are few speciﬁc digit patterns that can’t be masked by CNF approach and this is where
preprocessing may come handy. As an instance, repetition of digit d (> 2) for d times (identiﬁed as category 1) and
repetition of digit d for d/ times (identiﬁed as category 2) are examples of such patterns. In14, authors proposed that
if the digits used in user password fall under category 1, system generates same set of patterns for other digits (> 2).
Thus, for original password as 333 the generated list of sweetwords for k = 6 may be as following−
55555 88888888 4444 333 666666 999999999
Whereas for the second category, if user password contains digits like 444 then the value of d/ is considered as 3
and the generated list of probable sweetwords are as following for the same value of k as 6 −
555 444 888 222 111 666
Reviewing SSU parameter of the technique: This technique has no system interference and thus, imposes low
stress on memorability. The occurrence of typo error is less probable here. Though this method sets high security
standard in MSV resiliency and ﬂatness, from security perspective, mounting DoS attack is easy for this approach.
The maximum value of k becomes 7 for the passwords belonging to ﬁrst category and that of k = 9 for the passwords
belonging to the second category. Thus, the standard value of k (= 20) can’t be achieved here.
804   Nilesh Chakraborty and Samrat Mondal /  Procedia Computer Science  93 ( 2016 )  799 – 807 
4. Proposed Methodologies to Improve SSU Parameter
In this section, we propose few honeyword generation techniques that improve SSU parameter of some recently
proposed approaches, mentioned in previous section. Here we propose four approaches namely − (a) Storage opti-
mized modiﬁed-tail (SOMT) (b) Storage optimized caps-key (SOCK) (c) Storage optimized close-number-formation
(SOCNF) and (d) Storage optimized pre-processing (SOPP) . Next we elaborate these approaches one by one.
4.1. SOMT: improving SSU parameter of modiﬁed-tail
To improve SSU parameter of modiﬁed-tail, the concept of paired-distance-protocol in13 is used. While construct-
ing S, we have set |S | = k. Now k characters are chosen in such a manner that avoids normal character selection
tendency of user during formation of password. In Fig. 2, the probable set of characters that can be used to build the
set S for k = 20 has shown.
@ / } 2 (
T r & j ?
; + L *
∧ 9 . g ,
Fig. 2. Elements of set S of car-
dinality 20 in SOMT
Fig. 3. Formed circular list us-
ing the elements of S
While selecting the tail, user chooses 2 diﬀerent characters from the set S as of modiﬁed-tail approach. Then
system calculates the paired distance (the number of cells that has to be traversed in clockwise direction to reach to
an element from other element) between two consecutive elements of the tail, chosen by user. For example, if user
selects his tail as ‘Tg’ then the calculated paired distance based on the circular list shown in Fig. 3 will be 2. In
password ﬁle FP, system maintains this paired distance (2 here, may be in the hash format) along with the username
and password. Instead of maintaining the original password index in the HC, system maintains the ﬁrst character of
the tail chosen by user along with corresponding username.
If FP is compromised, adversary obtains the password along with the paired distance. Now it is easy to check, for
a particular paired distance, there are |S | possible tails that can be formed. For example, if paired distance is 2 then
possible tails can be formed starting from each element of circular list as − rL, g9, L} and so on. On the other hand,
starting with a character, for a given paired distance, system always derives a unique tail. Thus, by only storing paired
distance, system confused attackers among k possible options.
After retrieving the login information, system ﬁrst derives paired distance from the submitted tail. If paired dis-
tance gets matched with the stored one then system directs the ﬁrst character of the submitted tail to the HC. If the
stored character gets matched with the received character then HC provides a positive feedback, otherwise a negative
feedback is generated. Below we show, using SOMT, the contents of FP and HC for username ui, password as pi and
selected tail as Tg.
FP <ui, H(pi), H(2)> HC <ui, T>
Analyzing SSU parameters of SOMT: As user has to remember a tail in SOMT, like in modiﬁed-tail thus, usabil-
ity standard of the proposed approach remains same as modiﬁed-tail approach. Now without knowing the orientation
of characters, adversary will not be able to know the paired distance, calculated from the tail chosen by user. Thus,
without compromising FP, the probability of mounting DoS attack can be calculated by following equation −
Pr(DoS) = (|S | − 1) ×
|tail|−1∑
i=0
1
|S | − i (3)
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For the standard values of |S | = 20 and |tail| (length of the tail) as 2, the above probability can be evaluated as
0.05. Thus, SOMT makes modiﬁed-tail a strong security provider against DoS attack. The method is also typo safe as
probability of entering a diﬀerent tail, by typing mistake which evaluates the same paired distance as stored one, is also
very less (in fact this too can be evaluated by using Equation 3). By sharing the circular list among diﬀerent systems,
as shown in13, SOMT can also build robust security standard against MSV. Using SOMT, system only stores single
extra information in terms of paired distance along with password. Thus, the value of k in this case only becomes 2.
4.2. SOCK: improving SSU parameter of caps-key
Using SOCK approach, system ﬁrst retrieves the index of the capital letters − chosen by user, from the user’s
password. For example, if user chooses his password as AniMal then system retrieves 0 and 3 as the index values
(starting with 0). System then converts all capital letters of user password in the small cases and stored the hashed
value of it in FP. The index values of capital letters are stored in the HC server along with username. Thus, for
username ui and password selected as AniMal we show the content of FP and HC below −
FP <ui, H(animal)> HC <ui, 0, 3 >
During login, user ﬁrst submits his login information. System then retrieves the index of capital letters from
submitted password string before converting it into small case. After converting the password in the small case,
system makes a hash transformation of whole password string. If obtained hash value gets matched with the stored
one then system directs the obtained index values of capital letters to the HC server. If the index values get matched
in the HC then it sends a positive feedback signal to the system administrator, otherwise directs a negative feedback
signal.
If we analyse the SOCK approach from the adversary point of view, then it is clearly noticeable that after inverting
a password hash adversary gets confused among
(
n
m
)
(n and m represent number of alphabets in password and how
many of them are in capital letters, respectively) possible options (assuming that value of m is known to adversary).
If the password information entered by the adversary gets matched with the stored string in lowercase but the indices
of capital letters are wrongly identiﬁed by the adversary then system detects the attack and blocks that adversary.
Analyzing SSU parameters of SOCK: From usability perspective, caps-key and SOCK maintain same level
of standard as user requires to remember same login information. SOCK attains low success rate while providing
security against DoS attack but achieves high level of security standard while addressing the MSV issue. Using
SOCK, attackers gets confused among
(
n
m
)
number of sweetwords which may be much larger than k = 20 for n ≥
6 and m = 2. Thus, SOCK can be identiﬁed as stronger security provider than of caps-key in terms of achieving
higher detection rate. We identify SOCK as zero-storage-cost honeyword based approach as, system doesn’t have to
store any extra information in FP to lure the attackers. This diﬀerentiates SOCK from all other honeyword generation
approaches, proposed so far.
4.3. SOCNF: improving SSU parameter of CNF
While optimizing the storage cost of CNF, we primarily motivated from10, where authors argued that storing
passwords in hash format is insigniﬁcant using a honeyword based approach as all honeyword based approaches play
their role after adversary successfully inverts all password hashes. Using SOCNF system maintains the password
in plain text format. The digits in the original user password are replaced with some other digit within a range ±r,
determined by the system administrator. Then system calculates the diﬀerences between the original digits used and
the replaced digits in the password. System stores this diﬀerence in the HC server. For example, for the original
password chosen by user as alex1992 system replaces 1992 by 1998, for the decided range by system administrator
as ±20 (taken as example). System then calculates the diﬀerence as 6 and stores this information in HC. Below we
show the content of FP and HC for SOCNF for username ui and password as alex1992.
Fp < ui, alex1998> HC <ui, 6>
Now while genuine user submits his password, system calculates the diﬀerence between digits in stored password
and submitted password. If content of submitted password (excluding digits in it) matches with the stored one then
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system directs the calculated diﬀerence to the HC. If the diﬀerence gets matched then HC sends a positive feedback. HC
sends a negative feedback if the diﬀerence value lies within ±r and doesn’t get matched with the stored value. From
the adversary point of view, the attacker gets confused among 2×r possible options after obtaining the password,
protected by SOCNF method.
Analyzing the SSU parameter of SOCNF: The security standard of SOCNF remains same as CNF approach.
Likewise SOCK, SOCNF can also be identiﬁed as zero-storage-cost honeyword based approach. The usability param-
eters in SOCNF doesn’t get diﬀer with respect to the CNF.
Next we introduce SOPP which improves SSU parameter of preprocessing technique.
4.4. SOPP: improving SSU parameter of pre-processing
For both the categories of pre-processing approach − category 1 and category 2 (see Section 3.4), in SOPP we
maintain a table in FP, shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Maintained table in SOPP for generating decoys.
digit/index 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Category 1 × × × valid valid valid valid valid valid valid
Category 2 valid valid valid valid valid valid valid valid valid valid
In SOPP, for category 1, system stores the password (may be in the hashed format or plain text) − after discarding
the digits, along with the category information (here category 1). In the HC, system stores the digit/index which has
been repeated. For example, if user selects his password as macro666666 then system stores macro (substring of
password contains non-numeric data) along with category 1 as user password info in FP. As user uses digit 6 in his
password thus, index value here will be 6 (see Table 1) and HC will store 6 along with the username. We present
content of FP and HC below for above example.
FP: <ui, H(macro), category 1> HC: <ui,6>
From the attacker point of view, after obtaining compromised FP, adversary gets to know the partial password
along with the category information. But adversary wouldn’t be able to understand the digit used by user. Entering
the partial password (here macro) correctly without properly identiﬁed digit, helps HC to detect the breach.
On the other hand for the password digits belonging to the second category, FP stores the partial password infor-
mation along with the category and the frequency of the digit. For example, for the password macro5555, FP stores
the password info as macro, category 2 and 4 (as digit 5 repeats for 4 times). In HC, system stores the digit 5 chosen
by user along with username as shown below.
FP: <ui, H(macro), 4, category2> HC: <ui,5>
When a user submits his login information, system ﬁrst categorizes the nature of the digit string. If it belongs to
category 2 system then matches the partial password information along with frequency. If match occurs system directs
the identiﬁed digit to the HC which generates the positive feedback signal if the digit/index value matches otherwise,
generates a negative feedback signal.
Analyzing SSU parameters of SOPP: From the security and usability perspectives SOPPmaintains same standard
as existing pre-processing technique. For the passwords belonging to category 1, system maintains single extra
information as category. For category 2 passwords, system maintains extra information as category and frequency,
which reduce value of k by 7. Next, we give comparative analysis between existing honeyword methods and proposed
approaches here.
Comparative study: We also compare the proposed storage optimized methods with the existing methods in14
and some other recently proposed methods like, take-a-tail10, modeling-syntax12 and chaﬃng-by-tweaking-digits
(CTD)10. The comparison results are based on SSU parameters and is shown in Table 2. The comparison result
shows that the proposed approaches in this paper improve the security standard compared to existing modiﬁed-tail
and caps-key approach. Also proposed approaches in this paper reduce the storage cost signiﬁcantly over all other
existing approaches.
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Table 2. Comparative analysis among methods with respect to SSU parameter. “*” denotes conditional ﬂatness (e.g. there exists no correlation
between username and password). Bold fonts indicate the improvements using the proposed approaches.
Method System-interference Stress-on-mem Typo-safety DoS resiliency Security against MSV Flatness Extra storage cost
modeling-syntax no low yes high low 1/k * k-1
take-a-tail yes high yes low high 1/k k-1
CTD no low yes high low 1/k * k-1
modiﬁed-tail yes low yes low high 1/k k-1
CNF no low no low high 1/k * k-1
caps-key yes low no low moderate 1/k k-1
pre-processing no low yes low high 1/k 6 and 9
SOMT yes low yes high high 1/k * 1
SOCNF no low no low high 1/k * Null
SOCK yes low no low high 1/k Null
SOPP no low yes low high 1/k 1 and 2
5. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we have proposed few storage optimized honeyword based approaches which not only reduce the
storage cost of previously proposed approaches but also improve the security standard from few aspects. We have
also shown that in some cases, honeyword based model can be built without even storing any extra information in
FP. While improving the security and storage standards, we take necessary care not to reduce the usability standards
of the proposed schemes compared to existing schemes. Improving the usability standards further of the proposed
approaches without compromising any SSU parameter is our future plan. Nevertheless we believe that this paper
reveals some important ﬁndings which encourage more use of honeyword based techniques in future.
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